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                                                                Abstract 
 
Using a firm-level survey database covering 50 countries we evaluate firms´ abnormal retained earnings. The results of our 
work show that the trends of cash holdings and retained earnings are independent. The results of our work indicate that small 
firms retain less earnings. Such is a problem once a large percentage of firms around the world are small. On the hand, we find 
that abnormal retained earnings decreased after 2008 financial crisis. It seems that investors are more risk averse and prefer 
bird-on-hands (cash dividends). Our result also establish many plausible relationships among retained earnings, agency 
problems and financial constraints.  
 
JEL classification: G32; G38 
Keywords: Abnormal retained earnings; Financing choices; Institutional environment;  Small firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The modern debate about capital structure and dividend policy theory has nearly 60 years old. In relation 
to capital structure theory, until the 80s decade, the focus of the analysis centered on topics related to the 
tax shield, together with the bankruptcy and agency costs and with the problems of information 
asymmetry, creating two currents, the trade off theory and the pecking order theory. In the last thirty years 
the empirical adherence of the two theories has been discussed for the financing of companies, with 
different results (Frank and Goyal (2005) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). At the same time, during 
the last twenty years, while researchers tried to evaluate the role of both theories with the aid of the 
companies features, they were equally analysing the institutional factors that could influence the financ ing 
of the companies. The legal origin (civil or common), the rule of law, the perception of corruption, the 
protection of the rights of the shareholders and creditors, the financial architecture of the country (banking 
or capital market based), among other aspects (Alves and Ferreira (2011), Alves and Francisco (2015), 
Booth et al (2001), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1998, 1999), Giannetti (2003), De Jong et al 
(2008), Fan et al (2012) and Öztekin (2015)) were now a very important topics on the firms´ capital 
structure analysis.  
In relation to dividend policy the research produced by Lintner (1956) was a striking point 
concerning the referred issue. He defended that dividends move consistently towards target payouts. 
According to his results companies tend to set long-run target dividends-to-earnings ratios according to 
the amount of positive net-present-value (NPV) projects they have available and earnings increases are 
not sustainable. As a result, dividend policy is not changed until managers can see that new earnings levels 
are sustainable. The research on dividend policy also focused on the discussion between bird-in-hands 
(cash dividends) versus birds-on-the bush (capital gains). According to defenders of bird-in-hands the 
value of firms increases with the delivery of high dividends (Lintner (1956), Gordon (1959) and Walter 
(1963)). Miller and Modigliani (1961), by its turn, illustrated that under certain assumptions, dividends 
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were irrelevant and had no influence on a firm´s share value. More recently, Bhattacharya (1979), John 
and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) focused their research in a new theory, designated by 
the signalling theory. They showed that, in a world of asymmetric information, better informed insiders 
use the dividend policy as a signal about their firm’s future prospect to less informed outsiders, and a 
dividend increase signals an improvement on firm’s performance, contrarily to a decrease. In fact, a 
dividend increase (decrease) should be followed by an improvement (reduction) in a firm’s profitability, 
earnings and growth. Moreover, there should be a positive relationship between dividend changes and 
subsequent share price reaction. 
Recently, corporate finance also focused on another important topic related to financing decisions 
issue, the cash holding decisions (Opler et al (1999) Dittmar et al (2003) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004)). 
According to their results cash holdings decisions can be explained by the trade off theory, the pecking 
order theory and the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986). In fact, apparently, the purposes of retained 
earnings can be similar to corporate cash holdings and both can be explained by trade off theory, i. e., to 
reduce the cost of financial distress and to minimise the cost of external funds. The pecking order theory 
can also support both topics. It postulates that funds internally generated are less costly, contrarilry to 
risky debt and particularly equity, the most expensive source of financing. The free cash flow theory of 
Jensen (1986) can also influence abnormal retained earnings and cash holdings once the excess of cash 
can be used by managers in their own interests, but not in the interests of shareholders. Independently of 
what is the theory that explain the best either cash holdings, or retained earnings, our results show a large 
difference between the impact of retained earnings and cash holdings on firms´ balancesheet. The weight 
of cash holgings on balancesheet is much higher (see figue 1), either before or after 2008 financial crisis. 
Our results show different trends for cash holdings and retained earnings. The annual average of retained 
earnings – obtained using the data of all available firms – was 6.1% in the period 1995-2007, comparing 
with 5% in the period 2008-2014. Cash holdings, by its turn, presented respectively 20.3% and 22.5% for 
both periods. These last results confirm the research that concludes the positive impact of financial crisis 
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on firms´ cash holdings (Song and Lee (2012) and Lian et al (2011)). They are also related with the 
findings of Graham and Harvey (2001), i. e., CFOs are continually trying to find out financing sources 
that allow firms to have financial flexibility in face of credit constraints and capital market devaluations, 
and with the precautionary motive to hold cash, defended by Keynes (1936), in order to hedge against 
future cash shortfall. Our results, showed that the financial flexibility in face of credit constraints or capital 
market devaluations (financial crisis) is solved through the usage of cash holdings instead of using retained 
earnings.  
Thus, there are several reasons to study the retained earnings, namely in comparison to cash 
holdings: first, both variables could have the same trend in order to respond to some financing needs. Our 
results, does not confirm such hypothesis;  second, why firms reduced the retained earnings after the 2008 
financial crisis once it is is the cheapest source of corporate financing; third, what is the source of finance 
to attain the precautionary motive? Our results show that the retain earnings does not respond to such 
need, contrarily to cash holdings; fourth, once investors prefer bird-in-hands, what are the alternatives to 
the cheapest source of financing? 
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Figure 1 – Retained Earnings versus Cash Holdings 
 
Note: The calculations were made considering a sample of 336.318 observations, 40.917 firms and 50 
countries. 
 
The main goal of this research is to examine which firms (including countries and financ ia l 
infrastructures) presented higher abnormal retained earnings in the period from 1995 to 2014 and what 
explains such behaviour. For that purpose we use a panel of 336.318 observations relatively to 40.917 
firms from 50 countries.  
In this research we find that the cash holdings and retained earnings present independent trends. 
Cash holdings are strongly motivated by the precautionary motive. Retained earnings, by its turn, are 
related with: capital structure once it is the cheapest source of financing; dividend policy once it influence 
the dividend pay out and the expected dividend growth rate, within other aspects; agency costs, once it 
seems they can be used to align the interests of different stakeholders. For example, the impact of banking 
development on abnormal retained earnings is not consensual. While the impact of developed capital 
markets and common law based markets on abnotrmal retained earnings is positive, the contrary occurs 
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for emerging capital markets, civil law based countries and the USA. Probabably in the case of developed 
capital markets and common law based countries the management intend to align the interests of 
creditholders with shareholders. In the remaining cases the decrease on asymmetric information between 
banks and firms can be an explanation for the result; and with financial constraints once we found a 
negative impact of capital market development on abnormal retained earnings, with statistica l 
significance, on developed capital markets and the opposite on civil law based countries and the USA. In 
relation to developed capital markets such can be a result of less restrictions on corporate financing and 
the investors are searching dividends. In the case of civil law based countries the positive signal can be 
attribute to the higher financial constraints imposed by infraestructures and probably as a result of 
investors prefer to retain earnings in order to obtain future market revaluations. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature review, the methodology and 
the data. Section 3 details the main results. Section 4 presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review, methodology and data 
 
This section presents a literature review about the variables that we consider to have power to explain the 
retained earnings: industry risk, divididend dummy, debt to assets, size, market-to-book, crisis dummy, 
capital market development, banking development and GDP growth. This is an effort that includes 
different debates on corporate finance, namely financing choices, cash holdings, financing constraints, 
dividend policy and corporate investment, among others. The variables used as determinants of retained 
earnings reflect different financing choices perspectives (pecking order theory, trade off theory, agency 
theory and financial flexibility theory). Following, we introduce the methodology to calculate the 
abnormal retained earnings and the hypothesis formulated. In the end of this section data is presented.  
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2.1.Literature review 
 
We use different firm-variables as determinants of retained earnings. A firm that currently does not pay 
dividends raise their funds on capital markets at higher cost, contrarily to a firm that often pays dividends. 
But moreover, the dividends payment may help to reduce the tradicional agency problem between 
managers and shareholders by reducing the amount of cash disposable by executives in their own interest 
(Jensen (1986)). Thus, a negative relationship between dividend payments and retained earnings is 
expected. Moreover, the defenders of bird-in-hands will prefer to have dividends instead of capital gains. 
Moreover, this relationship reflect the signalling theory whose defenders say that a dividend increase 
(decrease) should be followed by an improvement (reduction) in a firm’s profitability, earnings and 
growth. On the other hand, a firm that increases easily their leverage present lower problems on matter of 
information asymmetry (Myers (1984)) and consequently raise money at a lower cost. On the other hand, 
it is expected that such firm benefit of high tax shield in comparison with financial stress costs. Thus, an 
expected negative relationship between leverage and retained earnings is also expected. Concerning to 
industry risk, a firm that works on a sector based on higher volatility of earnings before interest and taxes 
is riskier but expectably more profitable. The rule is to issue safe securities. Internal funds are better than 
external funds and only, as a final resort, should a firm issue stock. In this case, it is expectable the use of 
retained earnings by firms, exploring the possibility of having the cheapest funding source. It is also 
generally accepted that larger firms present more diversified portfolios and lower probability of being in 
financial distress (Warner (1977) and Rajan and Zingales (1995)), encorouging large firms to hold less 
retained earnings. But moreover, some financial literature has concluded that small firms present higher 
financial constraints and consequently use less external finance (Beck et al (2005, 2008) and Audretsch 
and Elston (2002)). However, a firm retain more earnings to reinvest in a current and future projects only 
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if it is well succeeded (MacAnBhaird and Lucey (2010)) and we know that young firms grow faster but 
also fail at higher rates (Haltiwanger et al (2013) and Thornhill and Amit (2003)). 
 
Figure 2 – Retained Earnings versus economic growth versus Size – average from 1995 to 
2014 
 
Note: The calculations were made considering a sample of 336.318 observations, 40,917 firms and 50 countries. 
 
According to Myers (1977), firms with more assets in place should more easily be financed 
through debt than firms with growth opportunities, whose valuation depends on intangible assets and 
expected returns, are subject to high financial distress costs and their intangible assets have no value in 
the event of bankruptcy. Under these conditions, firms avoid to issue equity because much of the value 
created by investment would be used to offset the creditors’ position (underinvestment problem). On the 
other hand, firms with growth opportunities, with less collateral assets, experience more problems when 
they are in the presence of risky projects, because creditors see that as a way to expropriate wealth from 
themselves (the asset substitution problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976)). In face of these observations 
we expect a positive relationship betwwen retained earnings and firm´ s growth opportunities. 
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Diverse recent research evaluated the impact of recent financial crises on firms´ capital structure. 
In general, the results show that debt maturity and firm leverage was reduced after a financial crisis 
(Voutsinas and Werner (2011), Akbar et al (2012) and Demirguc-Kunt et al (2015)). Firms substituted 
long term debt by short term debt, reacting to the rise of uncertainty and risk. The term premium requested 
by lenders increased during the crisis which made short term debt more attractive than long term debt 
from their point of view (Gurkaynak and Wright (2012) and Dick et al (2013)). Facing financ ia l 
constraints, with barriers to access to the capital markets it is predictable that firms hold more cash than 
expected. In fact in the beginning of the century, Graham and Harvey (2001) introduced a new debate 
about financing choices that can help us to fundament the hypothesis about the relationship between 
abnormal retained earnings and financial crisis, the financial flexibility: an impressive number of CFO s´ 
declared that their financial decisions are based in response to uncertainty contingencies or a firm’s abilit y 
to access financing at a low cost and respond to unexpected changes in the firm’s cash flows or investment 
opportunities in a timely manner. In fact, Campello et al (2010) and Dunchin et al (2010) showed that 
during the financial crisis, firms generally were more financially constrained. In reality, shareholders 
towards an environment of financial crisis firms can prefer to have immediate dividends instead of future 
capital gains, and to hold or increase cash. It is possible that we find ount a positive relationship between 
crisis and cash holdings for precautionary motive, and a negative relationship between retained earnings 
and financial crisis because investors prefer bird-in-hands. Financial literature shows how important the 
legal system is for financial development (La Porta et al (1998, 1999) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998)) and how firms operating in countries where financial claimants are more protected 
(common-law based countries) tend to have capital structures with more equity and long-term debt 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Fan et al (2012)) and probably need to retain less earnings, 
given the opportunities to obtain external funds. Thus, a negative relationship between capital market 
development and retained earnings seems to exist. Moreover, it is possible for firms located in developed 
capital markets, where shareholders are well protected, to pay out their earnings because they easily access 
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to capital markets (La Porta et al (2000) and it enables minority shareholders to extract dividend payments 
from corporate insiders (vd. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales (2004)). In relation to 
banking development we expect a positive relationship between retained earnings and such variable. In 
fact, banks located in a well developed industries will align the interests of shareholders and creditholders 
retaining earnings. Otherwise, shareholders could expropriate wealth from creditholders (vd. La Porta et 
al (1998, 2000)). Firms always need cash to fund ongoing operations, particularly when economies are 
growing. Probably, in face of financial needs, they need to raise funds to finance investments using 
simultaneously internal and external funds even if this means giving up a degree of control. Thus, the 
more economy grows, the more earnings are retained by firms and the more firms hold cash in order to 
finance their activities. In fact, if an economiy is growing the expected dividend growth rate also grows 
and such only it is possible increasing the firms´ return on equity and reducing the dividend pay out ratio.  
 
 
 
2.2.Methodology and hypothesis 
 
Basically to evaluate the recent trends on retained earnings we follow two steps. First, we present the 
results of some regressions of cash holdings and retained earnings, using the same independent variables 
(capital market develpement, banking development, GDP growth, Industry risk, dividend dummy, debt to 
assets, size, market-to-book, and financial crisis dummy). Fundamentally, we intend to evaluate if both 
variables are explained by the same variables and if both variables result from management´s 
precautionary motive. The regressions are based on a pooled cross section (with country, sector and year 
dummies) and a panel data with fixed effects (with year dummies). The results of Hausman tests confirm 
that the parameters obtained using the fixed effexts model are consistent and efficient. In the second step 
we evaluate the determinants of abnormal retained earnings, based on the approach that we will present 
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below. In this analysis we divide also the sample in sub samples (emerging capital markets, developed 
capital markets, civil law based capital markets, common law based countries and the USA).   
Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends plus depreciation minus 
common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others and cash dividends paid divided by total 
assets. Cash holdings, by its turn, is cash dividends paid divided by total assets. 
Abnormal retained earnings are obtained based on the methodology employed by Brown and 
Warner (1985) and Barber and Lyon (1996). Basically firms´ abnormal retained earnings compares 
realized retained earnings with its expected value. The expected retained earnings is the firms´ annual 
average retained earnings by sector. The sample is divided considering the super sectors from industr ia l 
classification benchmark (ICB), that is, 16 sectors. By joining firms from the same sector but located in 
different countries we intended to build a variable that properly reflected the global systematic risk. 
The expected retained earnings of firm i in year t, is the firms´ average retained earnings in year t 
from the sector j where firm i operates: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡) =  𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡 
 
The abnormal retained earnings of firm i in year t, 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡, is realized retained earnings 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡, less 
expected retained earnings,  𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡): 
 
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡) 
 
To test the null hypothesis, in which average abnormal retained earnings is equal for a sample n, 
we employ a parametric test statistic:  
t = 
𝐴𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑆´ (𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 )/√𝑛
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where 𝐴𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the firms´ average abnormal retained earnings by country and 𝑆´ (𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡) is the 
cross-sectional sample standard deviation of abnormal retained earnings for a sample of n firms from a 
specific country. 
Following we intend to identify the determinants of 𝐴𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  using the independent variables and the 
models referred previously, taking into account the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Firms raise more abnormal retained earnings after the financial crises. 
H2: Firms present less abnormal retained earnings after capital market development and banking 
development 
H3:  Firms present more abnormal retained earnings after economic growth. 
 
2.3.Data 
 
The data extracted from Worldscope include firms from 50 countries: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, the UK, the US, and Vietnam.   
The sample is diversified with 40.917 firms and 336.318 observations, covering emerging capital 
markets, namely the largest, such as Mexico and Brazil; several developed capital markets, such as the 
UK and the US; diverse banking-oriented countries, including France and Germany; countries with 
different levels of investor protection, such as Indonesia and New Zealand; and countries whose 
economies show different levels of economic growth, such as China and Greece (see Table 1).   
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Data cover the period from 1995 to 2014. All firm-level variables are winsorized, excluding the 
bottom and the top 1% of the own variable distribution. Also financial institutions and utilities are 
excluded due the regulamentary rules they are subject to.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The average retained earnings by country varies from 3% (Greece, Hong Kong and Jordan) and 
8% (Argentina, Denmark, Peru, Russian Federation and Switzerland). On the other side, the average cash 
holdings vairies from 7% in Portugal and 29% in China. We would like to highlight in respect to average 
cash holdings the higher value (with statistical significance) presented by developed capital markets in 
comparison with emerging markets (5%). The same did not occurred in relation to retained earnings. The 
trends of the two variables were different in the periods before and after financial crisis. While the average 
retained earnings decreased from the period before to the period after the financial crisis (2%), the opposite 
occurred in relation to cash holdings, although in this laste situation without statistical significance.  
Finally, it must be referred the positive result (1%) for the difference on abnormal retained earnings on 
the period before in comparison to the period after financial crisis. Summing up, it seems that cash 
holdings explain the precautionary motive presented by Keynes (1936), contrarily to retained earnings. In 
this last case, the results suggest that the investors after financial crisis started to prefer to have a bird- in 
hands. 
Concerning to firm variables the results are heterogeneous; firms from Portugal, Pakistan and 
Greece present, in average, the highest value for debt to assets ratio (0.32); on the opposite side are 
Romania and Egypt (0.16); the largest firms, in average, are located in Netherlands, Mexico and Spain. 
Bulgaria, Jordan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Romania present the smallest firms; while firms in China, 
Sweden, the United States and Saudi Arabia present the highest market-to-book, the opposite can be 
observed in Romania, Bulgaria, and Portugal; in Egypt, Finland, Japan and Chile firms often pay 
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dividends, contrarily to Bulgaria, Romania, United States and Canada where firms do not pay regular ly 
dividends.  
Regarding to country variables, and specifically to banking development Japan, the United States, 
Spain, Denmark and Canada provide the largest infrastructure; Saudi Arabia, Peru, Argentina and Oman, 
on the contrary, present a reduced banking development; in relation to capital market development, 
Romania, Argentina, Vietnam and Bulgaria present the lowest percentages for the relation between market 
capitalization to GDP; on the contrary, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland and Hong Kong present the 
highest; in relation to economic growth, China, India, Sri Lanka and Vietnam were the winners during the 
period 1995-2014; Portugal, Italy, Greece and Japan were on the opposite side. 
Relatively to correlation coeficients the low value obtained for the relationship between retained 
earnings and cash holdings, giving strength to the previous results that both results are creted by different 
motives. In general, the correlation coefficients present values lower than 0,10.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 3 presents the determinants of cash holdings and retained earnings using a pooled data (with yar, 
country and and sector dummies) and a panel with fixed effects (with year dummies). We calculate the 
Hausman tests and they confirmed efficiency and consistency of the parameters of the panel data with 
fixed effects. 
 The results of all regressions confirmed that after financial crisis the level of cash holdings 
increased, contrarily to retained earnings. It seems that cash holdings behave as a way to to hedge against 
future cash shortfall. On the other hand, retained earnings decrease after financial crisis. It is possible that 
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firms are substituting long term debt by short term debt (vd. Alves and Francisco (2015)) and the agency 
costs of debt are now centered on short-term. Meanwhile, retained earnings are decreasing because 
investors prefer to have bird-in-hands. Concerning to the three institutional variables – capital market 
development, banking development and GDP growth – cash holdings increase after a rise of such 
institutional variables. We suspect that such occurs once firms use a period of wealth creation and 
financing development to increase cash holdings to make face a periods of financial crisis. In relation to 
retained earnings, it must be underlined the negative impact of capital market development retained 
earnings. Such occurs because in those countries it is easier to obtain external financing and probably 
firms like to present larger pay out ratios (La Porta et al (2000)). And, in fact, when we analyse the impact 
of dividend dummy on retained earnings, the parameter is not always negative, on the contrary, but when 
the parameter is consistent and efficient (fixed effects) it is in fact negative. Perhaps it is a way of the 
management to demonstrate to minority shareholders that they intend to not expropriate wealth from them 
to give to large shareholders. In relation to banking development the retained earnings, in general, increase 
with the use of debt by firms in order to align the interests of the shareholders with creditholders.     
 In relation to firm variables we would like to emphasize the opposite results of industry risk and 
size as explanatory variables of cash holdings and retained earnings. In relation to industry risk the 
opposite results suggest once more we are in the presence of two variables with different objectives in 
terms of corporate finance. While cash holdings reflect precautionary motives and financial flexibility, 
retained earnings, by its turn, represent the cheapest source of financing, dividend policy and financ ia l 
constraints. In both cases the value of the parameters present a large amplitude ((from 0.0388 to 0.594 in 
the case of cash holdings and from -0.0299 to -0.1367 in the case of retained earnings) which means that 
the parameters are highly dependent of econometric choices and settings (country, year and sector). In 
relation to size, the parameters present a lower amplitude. However the signs of the parameters are 
different: while in the case of the cash holdings size influence them positively, the opposite occurs in 
relation to retained earnings. And in relation this latest variable is a source of concern. In fact, the smallest 
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firms not only present the highest financial constraints as also they are the lowest retainers of earnings. 
Perhaps this explains the plausible negative relationship between firms´death and age.          
  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 In table 4 we present the abnormal retained by countries, considering a pooled data (with year, 
country and sector dummies) and a panel data with fixed effects (with year dummies). As in the case of 
cash holdings and retained earnings, the hausman tests done for anormal retained earnings showed that 
the parameters using fixed effects are efficient and consistent. The signs of parameters are identical to 
those obtained for retained earnings. Capital market development produces a negative impact on abnormal 
retained earnings. An explanation for such result can be found in La Porta et al (2000) when they 
concluded that firms on undeveloped capital markets, where shareholders are not well protected, 
management offer a higher pay out ratio in order to signalize the investors that they are avoiding 
expropriate them. Moreover, this can be a measure that intend to show the large shareholders are not trying 
to expropriate the minority shareholders. This is particularly valid in countries with weak shareholder 
rights (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales (2004)). Concerning to economic growth, the 
results confirm a positive impact on retained earnings.  In relation GDP growth we found a positive 
relationship with retained earnings. An explanation for such result can be endorsed to the dividend growth 
level. In fact, when a economy grows the expected growth dividend rate also increases, and such can be 
due to the the increase of firm´s return on equity or to the decrease of dividend pay out, or even due to 
both variables. Banking development, by its turn, revelead a positive impact on abnormal retained 
earnings. The exception occurs when we do not consider country dummies, which could mean more 
should be analysed in terms countries infraestructures. However, when fixed effects are used this problem 
disappears. This result strength the idea that the increase of retained earnings accompanies the increase of 
the banking development in order the interests of creditholders are aligned with the shareholders. In 
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relation to firm variables we emphasize the positive impact of size on abnormal retained earnings. This 
result, as we referred previously, is not a good new for the small firms and for the majority of countries. 
In reality, in general, the business environment of the most countries is covered by small firms, and the 
results say that shareholders are always anxious to withdraw the profits from the firms, decreasing the 
expected age of the firms.     
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 5 analyses the determinants of abnormal retained earnings, considering the following 
subsamples: emerging markets, developed markets, civil law based countries, common law based 
countries and the the USA. Some results are confirmed. GDP growth has a positive influence on abnormal 
retained earnings. On the other hand, small firms present lower impact on abnormal retained earnings. 
Concerning to capital market development we found a negative impact on abnormal retained earnings, 
with statistical significance, on developed capital markets and the opposite on civil law based countries 
and the USA. In relation to developed capital markets such can be a result of less restrictions on corporate 
financing and the investors are searching dividends. In the case of civil law based countries the positive 
signal can be attribute to the higher financial constraints imposed by infraestructures and probably as a 
result of investors prefer to retain earnings in order to obtain future market revaluations. In the case of the 
USA probably means that investors are searching dividends and the management are signaling future 
prospect of profits. In relation to banking development the signs of the parameter are also not consensual.  
While the impact of developed capital markets and common law based markets on abnotrmal retained 
earnings is positive, the contrary occurs for emerging capital markets, civil law based countries and the 
USA. Probabably in the case of developed capital markets and common law based countries the 
management intend to align the interests of creditholders with shareholders. In the remaining cases the 
decrease on asymmetric information between banks and firms can be an explanation for the result.   
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[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In relation to 2008 financial crisis, exception to the USA, the abnormal retained earnings presented 
a negative impact on abnormal retained earnings. Probably, as a result of risk aversion and the preference 
for the principle bird in hand.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this research is to examine which firms (including countries and financ ia l 
infrastructures) presented higher abnormal retained earnings in the period from 1995 to 2014 and what 
explains such behaviour. For that purpose we use a panel of 336.318 observations relatively to 40.917 
firms from 50 countries.  
In this research we find that the cash holdings and retained earnings present independent trends. 
Cash holdings are strongly motivated by the precautionary motive. Retained earnings, by its turn, are 
related with: capital structure once it is the cheapest source of financing; dividend policy once it influence 
the dividend pay out and the expected dividend growth rate, within other aspects; agency costs, once it 
seems they can be used to align the interests of different stakeholders. For example, the impact of banking 
development on abnormal retained earnings is not consensual. While the impact of developed capital 
markets and common law based markets on abnotrmal retained earnings is positive, the contrary occurs 
for emerging capital markets, civil law based countries and the USA. Probabably in the case of developed 
capital markets and common law based countries the management intend to align the interests of 
creditholders with shareholders. In the remaining cases the decrease on asymmetric information between 
banks and firms can be an explanation for the result; and with financial constraints once we found a 
negative impact of capital market development on abnormal retained earnings, with statistica l 
20 
 
significance, on developed capital markets and the opposite on civil law based countries and the USA. In 
relation to developed capital markets such can be a result of less restrictions on corporate financing and 
the investors are searching dividends. In the case of civil law based countries the positive signal can be 
attribute to the higher financial constraints imposed by infraestructures and probably as a result of 
investors prefer to retain earnings in order to obtain future market revaluations. 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics of Firm-Level and Country-Level Variables 
Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus 
common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751). CH are cash dividends paid (WC 04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) 
are expected retained earnings and it  is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector. Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings 
before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´  
sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilit ies (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), 
deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 
04551. BD is banking development and is defined as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: W orld Bank, except for 
Taiwan). CMD is capital market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (so urce: World 
Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. Firms and N are the number of firms and observations, 
respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014.  
Country RE E(RE) CH 
Ind
Risk 
D/A SIZE MtB 
Dividend 
D 
BD CMD 
GDP 
GROWTH 
Firms N 
Developed 
             
AUSTRIA 0,07 0,06 0,18 0,14 0,24 12,48 1,32 0,69 1,26 0,26 0,02 124 1.010 
BELGIUM 0,07 0,06 0,18 0,15 0,24 12,52 1,51 0,63 1,12 0,65 0,02 154 1.310 
CANADA 0,05 0,06 0,19 0,18 0,21 10,87 1,66 0,31 1,84 1,09 0,02 2.287 13.766 
DENMARK 0,08 0,06 0,17 0,15 0,25 11,81 1,57 0,59 1,85 0,53 0,01 217 2.061 
FINLAND 0,07 0,06 0,18 0,15 0,24 12,51 1,60 0,80 1,00 1,13 0,02 159 1.734 
FRANCE 0,06 0,06 0,19 0,16 0,22 12,29 1,48 0,61 1,21 0,76 0,02 1.087 8.631 
GERMANY 0,06 0,06 0,22 0,16 0,20 12,17 1,56 0,50 1,37 0,46 0,01 1.018 8.460 
GREECE 0,03 0,05 0,10 0,14 0,33 11,35 1,15 0,58 1,21 0,43 -0,01 323 2.297 
HONG KONG 0,03 0,05 0,30 0,15 0,19 11,37 1,34 0,53 1,63 7,57 0,04 970 11.216 
IRELAND 0,06 0,06 0,24 0,16 0,23 12,41 1,70 0,61 1,49 0,57 0,05 90 777 
ISRAEL 0,04 0,05 0,29 0,17 0,28 11,18 1,37 0,35 0,86 0,78 0,04 421 3.048 
ITALY 0,04 0,06 0,16 0,15 0,27 12,66 1,31 0,59 1,24 0,40 0,00 311 2.784 
JAPAN 0,05 0,06 0,25 0,15 0,23 12,77 1,16 0,85 3,21 0,75 0,01 4.401 46.453 
KOREA (SOUTH) 0,05 0,05 0,21 0,15 0,25 11,81 1,13 0,59 1,46 1,42 0,04 1.820 17.875 
NETHERLANDS 0,08 0,06 0,15 0,15 0,23 13,14 1,69 0,65 1,65 0,99 0,02 249 2.377 
NEW ZEALAND 0,05 0,06 0,12 0,15 0,22 11,06 1,66 0,70 1,31 0,35 0,03 144 1.240 
NORWAY 0,05 0,06 0,23 0,15 0,29 11,79 1,61 0,44 0,78 0,50 0,02 309 2.187 
PORTUGAL 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,14 0,34 12,04 1,12 0,58 1,44 0,39 0,02 100 834 
SINGAPORE 0,05 0,05 0,25 0,15 0,20 11,27 1,23 0,64 0,82 2,08 0,06 708 7.307 
SPAIN 0,06 0,06 0,13 0,14 0,29 12,97 1,53 0,65 1,91 0,90 0,01 176 1.092 
SWEDEN 0,04 0,06 0,23 0,16 0,17 11,29 1,92 0,52 1,29 0,90 0,02 566 4.357 
SWITZERLAND 0,08 0,06 0,22 0,15 0,21 12,86 1,67 0,70 1,66 2,11 0,02 258 2.896 
UNITED KINGDOM 0,05 0,06 0,20 0,16 0,17 11,41 1,76 0,63 1,54 1,25 0,02 2.812 20.414 
UNITED STATES 0,07 0,06 0,25 0,17 0,23 12,17 1,97 0,30 2,07 1,26 0,03 9.399 69.420 
Mean 0,06 0,06 0,20 0,15 0,24 12,01 1,50 0,59 1,47 1,15 0,02     
Emerging 
             
ARGENTINA 0,08 0,06 0,11 0,14 0,18 11,61 1,26 0,45 0,29 0,15 0,06 68 548 
BRAZIL 0,04 0,05 0,17 0,15 0,29 12,43 1,40 0,63 0,87 0,51 0,03 390 2.472 
BULGARIA 0,04 0,05 0,09 0,15 0,18 8,84 1,03 0,27 0,58 0,20 0,03 194 1.285 
CHILE 0,05 0,06 0,09 0,14 0,21 11,71 1,21 0,84 0,90 1,02 0,04 158 1.739 
CHINA 0,05 0,05 0,29 0,15 0,21 12,18 1,93 0,69 1,47 0,47 0,09 2.516 11.463 
EGYPT 0,06 0,05 0,22 0,14 0,16 10,87 1,54 0,74 0,82 0,49 0,04 138 911 
INDIA 0,07 0,05 0,09 0,15 0,31 10,88 1,39 0,64 0,67 0,77 0,07 2.235 18.996 
INDONESIA 0,06 0,06 0,15 0,14 0,31 11,15 1,39 0,48 0,44 0,40 0,05 362 4.241 
JORDAN 0,03 0,05 0,14 0,15 0,17 9,12 1,35 0,35 1,08 1,06 0,05 151 926 
KUWAIT 0,06 0,05 0,23 0,14 0,22 11,17 1,30 0,64 0,65 1,16 0,03 94 660 
MALAYSIA 0,04 0,05 0,17 0,14 0,22 10,77 1,13 0,60 1,30 1,41 0,05 1.086 12.087 
MEXICO 0,06 0,06 0,10 0,14 0,24 13,10 1,28 0,46 0,36 0,29 0,03 146 1.572 
OMAN 0,07 0,05 0,16 0,14 0,25 10,18 1,40 0,60 0,34 0,46 0,04 84 580 
PAKISTAN 0,07 0,05 0,12 0,14 0,33 10,82 1,28 0,69 0,44 0,22 0,04 189 2.197 
PERU 0,08 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,21 11,25 1,23 0,54 0,20 0,41 0,05 108 910 
PHILIPPINES 0,06 0,06 0,16 0,15 0,20 10,41 1,37 0,43 0,52 0,55 0,05 182 1.983 
POLAND 0,06 0,05 0,14 0,15 0,17 11,22 1,40 0,36 0,56 0,31 0,04 364 2.799 
ROMANIA 0,04 0,05 0,12 0,16 0,15 9,98 0,97 0,28 0,39 0,12 0,03 121 852 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 0,08 0,05 0,13 0,17 0,26 12,60 1,22 0,33 0,35 0,51 0,03 398 1.669 
SAUDI ARABIA 0,07 0,05 0,15 0,13 0,20 12,19 2,26 0,70 0,18 0,64 0,05 93 649 
SOUTH AFRICA 0,08 0,06 0,18 0,16 0,17 11,75 1,48 0,63 1,74 1,96 0,03 554 4.152 
SRI LANKA 0,06 0,06 0,11 0,14 0,22 9,44 1,39 0,65 0,45 0,25 0,06 142 1.183 
TAIWAN 0,05 0,05 0,27 0,16 0,22 11,50 1,38 0,56 1,45 1,41 0,05 1.693 17.493 
THAILAND 0,06 0,06 0,13 0,14 0,28 11,09 1,27 0,67 1,30 0,65 0,04 511 5.899 
TURKEY 0,05 0,05 0,13 0,14 0,22 11,83 1,43 0,38 0,64 0,32 0,05 243 2.035 
VIETNAM 0,07 0,05 0,18 0,14 0,25 9,78 1,16 0,59 1,07 0,21 0,06 594 3.471 
Mean 0,06 0,05 0,15 0,15 0,22 11,07 1,36 0,55 0,73 0,61 0,05     
Developed - Emerging 0,00 0,00 0,05           
p-value 0,41 0,00 0,00           
Common - Civil 0,00 0,00 0,03           
p-value 0,46 0,95 0,19           
Before Crisis - After Crisis 0,02 0,01 -0,01           
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,43           
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Table 2 – Correlation Coefficients  
Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus 
common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751). CH are cash dividends paid (WC 04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) 
are expected retained earnings and it  is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector. Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings 
before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´  
sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilit ies (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), 
deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 
04551. BD is banking development and is defined as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: W orld Bank, except for 
Taiwan). CMD is capital market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (source: World 
Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan.   
 
  
CH RE ARE CMD  BD 
GDP          
GROWTH  
IndRisk   
Dividend 
D 
D/A SIZE  MtB  CrisisD  
CH 1,00                       
RE 0,00 1,00            
ARE 0,01 0,99 1,00           
CMD  0,08 -0,03 -0,03 1,00          
BD 0,13 -0,02 -0,02 0,04 1,00         
GDPGROWTH  -0,04 0,05 0,03 0,06 -0,41 1,00        
IndRisk  0,19 -0,02 0,00 0,02 0,03 -0,06 1,00       
Dividend D -0,06 0,16 0,16 -0,04 0,08 0,00 -0,18 1,00      
D/A -0,34 -0,12 -0,13 -0,05 -0,04 0,02 -0,11 -0,08 1,00     
SIZE  0,28 0,12 0,11 0,02 0,00 0,06 0,20 -0,08 -0,09 1,00    
MtB  -0,16 0,24 0,23 -0,03 0,23 -0,12 -0,15 0,36 0,09 -0,06 1,00   
CrisisD  0,03 -0,04 0,00 0,01 0,05 -0,16 -0,15 0,04 -0,02 -0,10 0,02 1,00 
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Table 3 – Cach Holdings and Retained Earnings around the World 
Dependent variable is cash holdings and retained earnings. Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 
01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751). Cash dividends is cash dividends paid 
(WC 04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). ARE compares the firms´ retained earnings with its expected value. The expected retained earnings is the 
firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector.  Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and 
amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms  ´sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to 
book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilit ies (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible 
debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551 (source: Wo rld Bank, except for 
Taiwan). (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. Observations and firms are the number 
of observations and firms, respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. Statistical inference based on cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust p-values are in parentheses. 
VARIABLES 
Cash Holdings Retained Earnings 
Pooled Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled Fixed 
Effects 
CMD  t   0.0022   0.0086   0.0023   0.0028   -0.0004   -0.0019   -0.0005   -0.0004 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.08)  (0.34) 
BD  t  0.0265  0.0457  0.0232  0.0038   0.0087  -0.0099  0.0083  0.0162 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH  t  0.0396  0.1103  0.0497  0.1366  0.1783  0.1575  0.1786  0.1369 
p-value  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
IndRisk  t  0.5940  0.1288  0.1575  0.0388  -0.0299  -0.1277  -0.1367  -0.0489 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Dividend D t  -0.0044  -0.0006  0.0008  0.0123  0.0210  0.0173  0.0207   -0.0027 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.48)  (0.38)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
D/A t  -0.3388  -0.3226  -0.3232  -0.1839  -0.0679  -0.0672  -0.0696  -0.1116 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE  t  -0.0187  -0.0158  -0.0183  -0.0287  0.0127  0.0125  0.0127  0.0231 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MtB t  0.0522  0.0493  0.0498  0.0222  0.0105  0.0109  0.0107  0.0127 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
CrisisD  t    0.0305    0.0298    0.0371    0.0333 -0,0266 -0,0182 -0,0255 -0,0299 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant 0.2094 0.2356 0.2493 0.5064  -0.0720  -0.0641  -0.0654  -0.2035 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country  dummy  Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No 
Sector dummy  No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes  No 
Observations 336.318 336.318 336.318 336.318 336.318 336.318 336.318 336.318 
Firms 40.917 40.917 40.917 40.917 40.917 40.917 40.917 40.917 
Adj. R2 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.68 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.41 
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Table 4 – Abnormla Retained Earnings around the World 
Dependent variable is cash holdings and retained earnings. Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 
01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751). Cash dividends is cash dividends paid 
(WC 04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). ARE compares the firms´ retained earnings with its expected value. The expected retained earnings is the 
firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector.  Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and 
amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms  ´sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to 
book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilit ies (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible 
debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551 (source: World Bank, except for 
Taiwan). (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. Observations and firms are the number 
of observations and firms, respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. Statistical inference based on cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Abnormal Retained Earnings 
Pooled Fixed 
Effects 
CMD  t   -0.0005   -0.0020   -0.0005   -0.0005 
p-value  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.26) 
BD  t  0.0070  -0.0100  0.0066  0.0148 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH  t  0.1769  0.1544  0.1734  0.1335 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
IndRisk  t   0.0166  -0.0609  -0.0714  -0.0008 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.96) 
Dividend D t  0.0201  0.0170  0.0206   -0.0030 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
D/At  -0.0684  -0.0671  -0.0695  -0.1107 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE  t   0.0123   0.0125   0.0128   0.0230 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MtB t  0.0103  0.0108  0.0106  0.0124 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
CrisisD  t    0.0020    0.0092    0.0030     -0.0062 
p-value  (0.19)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00) 
Constant  -0.1520  -0.1509  -0.1520  -0.2322 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country  dummy  Yes  No Yes  No 
Sector dummy  No Yes Yes  No 
Observations 336.318 336.318 336.318 336.318 
Firms 40.917 40.917 40.917 40.917 
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.06 
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Table 5 – Abnormla Retained Earnings around the World by Class of Countries  
Panel regressions report firm fixed-effects. Dependent variable is abnormal retained earnings (ARE). Retained earnings (RE) are retained earnings. Retained 
earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred 
redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) and cash dividends paid (WC 04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). ARE compares the firms´  
retained earnings with its expected value. The expected retained earnings is the firms  ´annual average retained earnings by sector.  Industry risk is the yearly 
standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) 
to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilit ies (WC 
03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. 
Dividend dummy results from WC 04551 (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also 
from World Bank, except for Taiwan. Observations and firms are the number of observations and firms, respectively. Sample per iod is from 1995 to 2014. 
Statist ical inference based on cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust p-values are in parentheses. 
VARIABLES 
Emerging 
Markets 
Developed 
Markets 
Civil Law based 
Countries 
Common Law 
based Countries 
USA 
CMD  t 0.00020 -0.0007  0.0204 -0.0004 0.0110 
p-value  (0.22)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.35) (0.00) 
BD  t -0.0133 0.01083    -0.0084 0.0105 -0.0436 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH  t 0.0749 0.1689 0.1481 0.12947 0.0957 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
IndRisk  t 0.1481 -0.0569 0.0709 -0.0556 0.0237 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.37) 
Dividend D t -0.0060 -0.0010  -0.0058 -.00509 -0.0059 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.16)  (0.00) (0.56)  (0.00) 
D/A t -0.1291 -0.1031 -0.1293 -0.1000 -0.0916 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE  t 0.0178 0.0260 0.0202   0.02465   0.0377 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
MtB t 0.0142 0.0123 0.0142   0.01151 0.0144 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) 
CrisisD  t -0.0061   -0.0173 -0.0058 -0.0210 0.0012 
p-value  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.48) 
Constant -0.1873 -0.3230 -0.2729 -0.28553  -0.3864 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 102.772 233.546 164.616 171.702 69.420 
Adj. R2  0.11  0.06  0.09  0.06  0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
